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This essay examines the relationshipbetween social theory andsocial
problems, the truth-value of theories, and the importance of theorizing about the role of the state, i.e., national government, in the
resolution of social problems and the achievement of social justice.
The authorargues that much contemporarysocial theory has lost its
moorings in regardto ameliorationofsocialproblems, that Popper's
criterionoffalsification is a requisiteformore meaningfully applied
social theory, and that the state should be part of any social theory
meant to address social problems. Moral and political philosophy
is used to provide criteria to justify a positive rolefor government
to develop and implement policies to achieve a more justice society
than would be the case if market mechanisms were deemed the most
appropriate arbiter of economic and social exchange. The author
concludes with examples of his own theoretically driven and empiricallygrounded researchon social justice to tie together the elaborated themes of social theory,falsification,and retaining the state
as an object of theoreticalinquiry when addressingsocial problems.
Keywords: social theory, role of the state, social problems, social
justice

This essay covers three broad topics: the relationship
between social theory and social problems, the truth-value of
theories, and the importance of theorizing about the role of the
state, i.e., national government, in the achievement of social
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justice. First, much contemporary social theory has interest
in ameliorating of social problems, a goal of classical social
theorists. Second, many social theorists tend to fall into two
camps, those who are more concerned that their theories be
correct (have truth value) and those who want their theories
to be useful. Each camp, however, fails to see that truthfulness
and utility are important to theoretical developments meant
to have any viability in regard to amelioration of social problems and realization of social justice. Third, without the legitimate, tangible incentives and moral exhortations inherent in
policies issued by national governments, these goals cannot be
achieved. The contemporary global economy requires national
level leadership.
This essay draws on Mouzelis (1995) and Unger
(1987/2004a&c. Also see 1975), whose "old fashion theory
books" apply a set of critical arguments on conceptual themes
(Cohen, 1996). It also relies on Popper (1961, 1965, & 1968)
whose efforts to demarcate scientific theories/knowledge from
other bases or claims of theoretical knowledge (e.g., ideology,
religion, law, logic) provide a useful criterion by which to
judge the capacity of social theories to adjudicate truth claims
(Also see Baert, 2005; Magee, 1985). Evans, Rueschemeyer,
and Skocpol (1985) and others (e.g. Barry, 2004; Peters, 2004)
provide theoretical insights into the importance of the state
in safeguarding against the erosion of the public sphere, promoting protections against the vicissitudes of the market, and
providing the institutional structure within which contested
aspects of social justice can be settled. Finally, this essay illustrates how normative or emancipative social justice theories,
types of which Popper would reject on principle because they
are not scientific, can nonetheless provide a basis for empirical investigation for purposes of knowledge building in a way
that Popper would in all likelihood approve. To do this, the
author relies on examples of his own conceptual and empirical works (Caputo, 2005a & b; 2004; 2003a & b; 2002a & b) that
can be used in support of arguments justifying a positive role
for national government in the amelioration of social problems
and the achievement of social justice.
It should be clear from the outset that this essay will be
silent in regard to theory development for its own sake, a
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position advocated by Kiser and Hechter (1991; Also see Hage,
1994; Jasso, 2001). Somers (1998) criticized Kiser and Hechter's
"theoretical realism" (the thesis that belief in an explanation depends on belief in the a priori theory from which it is
imputed) and posited "relational realism" which places greater
emphasis on the pragmatic aspects of explanation (Also see
Skocpol, 1994; Quadagno & Knapp, 1992). Somers's position is
adopted in this paper. The author contends that amelioration
of social problems and the realization of social justice are better
served when theories are developed with problem resolution
and social betterment in mind rather than as a byproduct or
epiphenomenon of formal theory development.
Types and uses of theory
Any classification of types and uses of theory is inherently
arbitrary and suspect, perhaps at best reflecting latent if not
overt biases of whoever constructs such a scheme and at worst
leading to epistemological paralysis if pressed for logical consistency and coherency. Nonetheless, for analytical purposes
classification schemes are necessary to get the present discussion going with some degree of clarity so that contestation
when warranted can move forward rather than end in a stalemate. Wagner (1963), albeit "dated" but nonetheless useful as
a backdrop to the subsequent discussion of how contemporary
social theorists lost their moorings, identifies three main types
of social theories that still have relevance: positive, interpretive, and evaluative. Positive social theories are those whose
authors consider themselves and treat their theories within the
tradition of the natural sciences. For analytical purposes, these
include neo-positivists (e.g., Lundberg, 1955), human ecologists
(e.g., Duncan, Schnore, & Rossi, 1959), structural functionalists
(e.g., Merton, 1968), social behaviorists (e.g., Homans, 1958,
1987), and bio-psychologists (e.g., Linton, 1940).
Interpretive social theories are those whose authors adhere
to the general methodological rules of science, but in contradistinction to the natural sciences. These social theorists adhere
to the Weberian conception of "value-free" science, while the
"value-relevant" nature of the human subject matter nonetheless relies on a methodology of social inquiry that is sui generis.
Interpretive social theories include cultural understanding
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(e.g., Riesman, 1950), action and interaction (e.g., Becker, 1953),
social psychology or symbolic interaction (e.g., Goffman, 1956),
and social phenomenology (e.g., Schutz, 1970).
Evaluative social theories are those whose authors neither
consider nor treat their theories within the realms of positive
or interpretative science. Rejecting both positive "objectivity"
and interpretive "value-neutrality," evaluative social theorists
proceed on the basis of their philosophical premises, ideological convictions, and value systems. Systematic philosophical
expositions, coherent ideological orientations, sets of social
ideals, or systems of moral principles form the basis of such
theories. Evaluative social theories include social philosophical (e.g., Wolff, 1959), ideological social (e.g., Lynd, 1939), and
humanitarian reform (e.g., Thompson, 1961). Given these
three strands, whatever convergences in social theory that occurred in earlier times are now gone (Giddens & Turner, 1987;
Lundberg, 1956).
Modem social theory - what is wrong with it?
Mouzelis. To the extent Mouzels (1995) is correct, social
theorists went wrong when they failed to go beyond Parson's
(1951) adaptation (A), goal-attainment (G), integration (I),
and latency or pattern-maintenance/tension management (L)
scheme (AGIL) for the analysis of social systems and instead got
bogged down in theories of rational choice (e.g., Becker, 1991),
structuration (e.g., Giddens, 1984), figuration (e.g., Bourdieu,
1989), and the like (Cohen, 1996). He seeks to preserve objectivity, associated with positivist social theory characteristic of
the Durkeimian-Parsonian functionalist tradition, and valueneutrality, associated with Weberian interpretive social theory
tradition. Mouzels argues against the over determinism of the
former and the neglect of hierarchical, institutional structures
in the latter. He also argues against philosophical and ideological approaches to social theory that weaken ties between
theory and empirical research. Such theories (e.g., Baudrillard,
1981) collapse the boundaries between and within intellectual disciplines, boundaries that are requisite for theoretical
development.
Mouzels (1995) argued that Parsonian theory, while
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providing a conceptual framework for the study of cultural,
social, and personality systems, overemphasized "systemness"
or determinacy at the expense of agency on both the macro and
micro levels of analysis. Micro-level rational choice theorists
got it wrong by exclusively focusing on an inadequate if not incorrect conceptualization of individual decision making and by
omitting any consideration of the context within which preferences are formed and decisions made. Interpretative theorists
got it wrong by identifying action/interaction, or symbolic
interaction, with micro-level analysis and institutional structures with macro-level analysis and by systematically neglecting social hierarchies they failed to link the two. Transcendent
social theorists, that is, those who attempted to transcend the
micro-macro dichotomy (e.g., Bourdieu, 1989) nonetheless retained the functionalist logic inherent in Parsonian theory. That
logic incorrectly applied AGIL systemic attributes appropriate
for collectivities as wholes to subsystems that do not necessarily refer to any specific sub-collectivity with its own clearly
defined goals and decision-mechanisms. As such, Bourdieu's
"habitus" for example, downplayed the voluntary, interactionsituational dimension of human agency and thereby retained
functionalism's deterministic character.
Mouzelis (1995) posits that the road ahead for social theory
resides with linking micro with macro and action with institutional structure in a way that facilitates empirical research
on the constitution, reproduction, and transformation of social
systems. The detailed particulars of his nascent scheme for
doing so go beyond the scope of this essay. Briefly, Mouzelis
retains the Parsonian AGIL logic of systemic wholes, but recommends viewing all institutional spheres (economic, political, legal, educational / familial / religious) in terms of technologies, modes of appropriation / control, and ways in which
such controls are legitimated. This view would provide the appropriate tools for showing how institutional incompatibilities
lead, or fail to lead, to group conflicts on the economic (A), political (G), legal (I), and cultural (L) level. In addition it would
allow "who" questions about the constitution, reproduction,
and transformation of social wholes.
Ujner. Unger (1987/2004c) exhorts us to resuscitate and
retain the explanatory ambitions and emancipating potentials
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of classical social theory (Lie, 1996). "A politicized social theory
can coexist with natural science" Unger proclaims, "without
either imitating its methods or claiming an unjustified exemption from the responsibilities of causal analysis" (p. 170). Social
explanations incorporate causality but they do so in an "antinecessitarian" fashion, eschewing "false necessity" by encompassing contingency and thereby allowing for possibility
(Unger, 1987/2004a). The particulars of Unger's prescriptions
for transformative institutional experimentation have been
sufficiently criticized elsewhere (e.g., Shapiro, 1989. See Unger,
1987/2004b) and they need not concern us here. More to the
point of this essay is Unger's concern for the place and role of
social theory in our efforts to ameliorate social problems and
achieve social justice.
Unger (1987/2004c, pp. 80-169) argues that "deep structure" and "deep logic" theories such as those in the Marxist
and neoclassical economic traditions have failed on their own
terms because there is no teleological sequence or underlying
basic logic of the kind they posited (Shapiro, 1989). Positivist
science falls short in Unger's view in part because its underlying assumptions about cumulative knowledge building
have turned out to be unwarranted (Dahrendorf, 1997; Turner,
1994). Positivist science also falls short in part because of its
"refusal to take the distinction between the formative context
and the formed-routines, or between structure-preserving and
structure-transforming conflict, as central to the practice of
social and historical explanation" (Unger, 1987/2004c, p. 130).
Deconstructionists in the Foucaultian tradition also fall short.
Such theorists fail to construct, that is, as it subjects a current
state of affairs to seemingly endless critical inquiry, deconstructionists fail to make a positive case for a desirable alternative
that can withstand their own scrutiny.
As an alternative, Unger (1987/2004c) advances "super
theory," that is, a set of social theory practices that informs
general explanatory theories with historical particularities.
Such a "super-theory" approach to constructing social theories,
while empirically grounded in historical particulars, would
"explore the interplay between the attractions of empowerment through the invention of less imprisoning social contexts
and the countervailing forces that prod us into the prison"
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(p. 198). The goal of this explanatory super-theory would be
to "identify a formative set of institutional arrangements and
of enacted beliefs about the possible and desirable forms of
human action" to show how these "compulsive routines" are
politically constructed and how they limit transformative political action (Shapiro, 1989, p. 478).
Mouzelis (1995) would take Unger (1987/2004a&c) to task
for downplaying the vital role more limited or middle range
theories can play in regard to improving the usefulness of social
theory for purposes of problem solving. Nonetheless, both theorists retain agency as an essential component in social theory.
Retaining agency precludes the over determination characteristic of contemporary social theorists such as Giddens (1984) and
Bourdieu (1989). Concomitantly, both theorists retain the link
between theoretically driven empirically based research and
social transformation, while retaining the prospect of emancipation from unjust conditions. As such, their work is consistent
with that of Albert, Cagan, Chomsky, Hahnel, King, Sargern,
and Sklar (1986, p. 111) who have also explicitly linked social
theory as a component of scientific inquiry to social theory as
an instrument of social transformation. Their agendas for the
development of social theory are consistent with Popper's criterion for good scientific theory, namely generating hypothetical statements that can be falsified, which, as Kumar (1995) acknowledges, many of the post-industrial and post-modernist
theories do not satisfy (e.g., Baudrillard, 1987).
Popper and the Truth-Value of Theories
Karl Popper set out a model of natural science in The Logic
of Scientific Discovery (1959/1968) and he extended it to the
social sciences in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1943/1966)
and The Poverty of Historicism (1957/1961). Popper maintained
that no scientific theory could ever be conclusively proved or
declared true. The best we could do is to make predictions repeatedly and attempt to refute or falsify them. Social theories
for Popper were regulative ideals or logical fictions constructed for purposes of deducing predictions that could be tested,
or shown to be correct or incorrect. Popper saw no fundamental divide between natural or social science in the sense that

50
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
scientific truth claims were in principle hypothetical and potentially falsifiable. The test of falsification aided in the adjudication of competing scientific truth claims. Popper drew a
divide, however, between science and metaphysics. The latter's truth claims were constructed in such a way they were
not amendable to falsification, that is, to testing empirically.
The test of falsification would be inappropriate to adjudicate
truth claims across the scientific non-scientific divide.
Popper's anti-foundational approach to science defied the
relativism associated with post-modernist theorists' denial
of the validity of making truth claims (Baert, 2005; Kuhn
(1962/1970). Unlike poststructuralists and pragmatists, Popper
maintained that we could approach truth from experience. In
this regard, he echoed the views of logical positivists who also
believed that the only legitimate knowledge was that derived
from experience (Edge, 2001). Popper objected to the logical
positivists' view of science based primarily on verification and
posited instead that truth could be approached primarily from
errors.
In Popper's view scientific methods entailed the creative
production of hypotheses that could lead to predictions that
in turn could be verified or refuted by experience, with the
potential for refutation or falsification as the more significant attribute of the two for scientific advancement. Hence,
Popper regarded any discipline that did not lead to empirically testable predictions, such as Marxism or psychoanalysis,
as a pseudoscience (Chessick, 2001). Instead, much like Unger
(1987/2004a&c), Popper's contention that truth per se is best
stated hypothetically and treated provisionally (that is, subject
to testing empirically or to falsification) encourages a readiness to make bold assertions or conjectures in regard to how
things are or are likely to be and the honesty to recognize and
wherewithal to acknowledge when they are shown to be incorrect. That such conjectures can be shown to be incorrect
Popper does not doubt, thereby removing him from the camp
of post-modernists for whom truth is better abandoned as an
object of inquiry (Anonymous, 1992) and who view theory less
as a pragmatic test shot at empirical targets and more as a vital
component of creating the object under study as well as their
explanation (Alexander, 1988).
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Popper's falsification criterion has been critiqued, correctly in my opinion, for insufficiently specifying what counts as
falsifying criteria. The charge that failing the test of falsification in which a single counter-observation can falsify a theory
(Somers, 1998) is, in my view, an overstatement and it may
reflect a misunderstanding of his work (Magee, 1985, p. 19).
Much depends on what a theory purports to explain and how
adequately a crucial test is designed and implemented. A single
counter-observation of a hypothesis need not result in rejection of a theory per se, especially in the absence of a competing
theory that could be subjected to empirical test or even with
the availability of an alternative theory that does not allow for
such a test. Further, as Munro (2002) notes, if it is logically possible that an observation statement can be wrong, it is also logically possible that the theory, although apparently falsified by
it, might nonetheless be true.
Popper's insistence on the importance of empirically-based
methods as grounds for scientific truth claims and theoretical
development should by no means be construed to imply that
such methods were the only valid forms of inquiry for purposes of obtaining important insights into human development.
Disciplines such as moral psychology and political philosophy,
which benefit from logical argumentation, provide sufficient
evidence that such is not the case (Indick, 2002). Nor should
falsification be construed as the only criterion that theories
must meet to be considered scientific, as Baert (2005, p. 82) contends. Coherency, logical consistency, and parsimony are also
important. Nor should theory only provide researchers with
statements that can be tested. Theoretical progress also consists in generating better researchable questions (Quadagno &
Knapp, 1992).
The insistence in this essay is only to place ourselves as
social scientists in the position such that our theoretical assertions about causal relationships have the potentiality of
being shown to be wrong. In addition, we should admit as
much when someone does so. Our ability to act accordingly
is crucial in regard to truth claims about the efficacy of intervention strategies, whether designed by government to meet
public purposes or by practitioners such as social workers to
improve the social functioning of clients (Munro, 2002; Also
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see Gomory, 2002a & b; Thyer, 2001a & b).
Bringing the state back in
The proper role of the state in the society in general and in
the economy in particular continues to be one of ambivalence,
if not contestation (Bernstein, 2001; Caputo, 1994; Wier &
Skocpol, 1985). The increasing influence of international governing bodies and transnational corporations challenges the
relevance of national governments and nation-states (Kentor,
2005; Strange, 1996). Evans (1995) notes that international
bodies have a dampening effect on the expansion of the state's
role in the economy in countries that become major capital
exporters, especially centers of international finance capital.
These dampening effects should by no means be construed as
a cessation of state influence or importance as an actor in global
affairs. As Evans also notes, national governments are vitally
important to expanding economies and international relations
in developing countries. Caputo (2000) contends that the role
of the state is vital for purposes of social justice to securing
basic human rights for all citizens and, under specified laws,
for non-citizens within nations. In addition, the state plays an
important role in regard to poverty reduction, particularly in
regard to the legitimate or just redistribution of wealth within
as well as among countries (Caputo, 2005).
No one overarching theory of the state emerges from the
plethora of historical and comparative studies of the state in
the post-World War II period. The development of middlerange theories about state autonomy and capacity as a societyshaping and global-influencing institutional structure remain
an elusive but nonetheless worthy goal (Evans, Rueschemeyer,
& Skocpol, 1985; Jessop, 1990). How to achieve the right balance
of prosperity, civility and liberty is no easy matter, but the role
of the state remains crucial (Dahrendorf, 1997; Leadbeater,
2004). The need remains for state-related social theory amendable to falsification. The theoretical tasks at hand are to identify under what circumstances which components of the state
can foster conditions for people to create public goods and to
specify the causal links between government action and social
benefits. Such links in turn can then be subject to empirical
scrutiny. The empirical task is to check out whether the causal
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links do what the theories purport and if not
fications that can also be subject to empirical scrutiny.
Conclusion: Tying Together Theory, Falsification, and
Normative Aspects of Social Justice
This essay concludes with examples of my own work that
tie together theory, falsification, and normative aspects of social
justice in regard to two social problems: health disparities and
work-related discrimination. Caputo (2003) addresses health
disparities; Caputo (2002) addresses work-related discrimination. Both studies rely on the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, the 1979 cohort.
Before proceeding to my own work, however, it should be
noted that I avoid "totalizing" social theories such as those of
Parsons (1951) and Wallerstein (1974) which are primarily descriptive and leave little room for falsification (Kumar, 1995). I
also take issue in part with political philosophers such as Berlin
(1969, 1997) who limit the appropriate role of the state primarily to fostering "negative" liberty, as important as such related
freedoms no doubt are (Also see Gray, 1996). Instead, relying
on moral and political philosophers such as Rawls (2001, 1971),
Barry (2005), and Nathanson (1998), I delineate criteria which
if met can be used to justify a positive role for government to
develop and implement policies with distributional effects
aimed to achieve a more justice society than would be the case
if market mechanisms were deemed the most appropriate
arbiter of economic and social exchange. In doing so, my work
is consistent with those whose social theory takes the form of
moral or social philosophy (For a select review of such theorists see Holmwood, 2000; Rossides, 1998, pp. 295-297; for a
direct application, see Plant, Lesser, & Taylor-Gooby, 1980; for
a classic treatment on related themes, see Polanyi, 1944/2001).
For a more general treatment applying normative criteria to
assess the merits of policy-related programs whose outcomes
are amendable to empirical testing see Caputo (1989). As such,
my work falls within the evaluative strand of social theory as
developed by Wagner (1963).
Caputo (2003) found that socioeconomic status and race/
ethnicity were robust predictors of physical health and they
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provided support for expanding Rawls's index of social goods
to include social determinants of health. The theoretical issues
boiled down to whether it would ever be reasonable and rational to accept a tradeoff in which some health inequality was
(1) allowed in order to produce some non-health benefits for
those with the worst health prospects or (2) reduced in order
to produce health benefits for those with the worst health prospects. Justifiable grounds were examined for absolute gains in
overall health even if some were made worse off (but not too
seriously) and for relative health statuses in which resources
would be redistributed to those worst off either at the expense
of those better off (again, not to a serious or life-threatening
extent) or with no overall gain in health. The purpose of the
study was to determine under what conditions appeals for
social justice might be warranted for absolute gains in health
and for relative health statuses.
Falsifying conditions that would determine the merits of
social justice arguments for government action to reduce health
disparities included, for examples whether Blacks were found
to be worse off than Whites or whether women fared worse
than men in regard to measures of physical and mental health
when controlling for a variety of hereditary, background, lifestyle, and other cumulative and structural factors over the life
cycle. The finding that White and Black females fell below
White males on the measure of mental health lent support to
advocates of social justice who claim that the relative status
of groups can form the basis of legitimate governmental and
social interventions on their behalf. On the other hand, the
finding that Black males were less likely than White males to
fall below the typical U.S. person on the measure of physical
health used in the study challenged blanket appeals for racerelated interventions for redistribution of resources based on
appeals to social justice. The implication was that absolute (i.e.,
aggregate) gains in physical health could be pursued even if
Black males were not the beneficiaries or had no net gains.
The intent here is to present, not defend, these findings and
their implications. Limitations of the study, such as the participation only of non-institutionalized persons in the NLSY79
sample and the infant/childhood mortality rates of Black
males, can be found in the article (Caputo, 2003). For purposes
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of this essay, the merit of the theoretically driven and normative based study is that it was done in such a way that findings are subject to falsification from further scrutiny and policy
prescriptions are made with caution in mind since they would
need to be modified accordingly if findings were shown to be
incorrect.
Caputo (2002) examined work-related discrimination. This
study pitted two social justice theories against one another:
the classical utilitarian tradition of maximizing the greatest
good vs. the liberal utilitarian tradition of maximizing good
without worsening the situation of the most disadvantaged
persons. On-going debates about affirmative action often pit
justice claims of Blacks and women for preferential treatment
on liberal utilitarian grounds against those of white males for
merit-based decisions on classical utilitarian grounds. In the
study, young labor force participants reporting discrimination
in their efforts to get good jobs were found to obtain more additional education and job training than those who reported
no such discrimination over the same time periods. Findings
suggested net aggregate gains as well as gains by historically
work-related discriminated groups (namely Blacks and women
in this study) and as such challenged blanket social justice
appeals for race- and gender-related interventions for redistribution of resources. Findings imply that social justice advocates would be on firmer footing to the extent they advance
public policies ensuring access to education and training in
the broadest possible sense affirming opportunity for all rather
than specific disadvantaged groups.
As with Caputo (2003), the intent here is to present, not
defend, these findings and their implications. The peer review
process of the manuscript made clear that the findings are controversial. In the final analysis, they were deemed to warrant
both further discussion (hence, the decision to publish) and
scrutiny.
In conclusion, the merits of Caputo (2003) and Caputo
(2002) are that 1) they are theoretically driven; 2) normatively
based; 3) done in such a way that findings are subject to falsification; and 4) suggest appropriate state action in light of
findings and limitations. These two studies are among several
others of mine that to different degrees tie together theory,
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falsification, and normative aspects of social justice in regard to
social problems (e.g., see Caputo, 2004). What links much of my
empirical work is that the studies are premised on the prospect
of using normative criteria as a basis for deciding appropriate
calls for state action to remedy social problems. Each is guided
by social theory taking the form of moral or social philosophy
for purposes of making an evaluation and each met Popper's
falsification criterion. Related hypotheses are constructed such
that they could be shown to be met or not and the social justice
arguments that identified a potential area of state intervention
either held firm or fell accordingly. If social theory is not to
wither or not to remain primarily an academic exercise which
may address social problems in an epiphenomenal way rather
than head on, then theoreticians should use Popper's criterion
as one of the main considerations when constructing theories,
have a specific social problem in mind, and specify normative
criteria upon which to judge whether study findings warrant
state action to achieve social justice.
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